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This paper analyzes prudential controls on capital flows to emerging markets from the perspective
of a Pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the deleveraging cycle. It presents a
model in which restricting capital inflows during boom times reduces the potential outflows during
busts. This mitigates the feedback effects of deleveraging episodes, when tightening financial constraints
on borrowers and collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing effects. In our model,












College Park, MD 20742
akorinek@umd.eduThis paper analyzes prudential controls on capital ﬂows to emerging markets from
the perspective of a Pigouvian tax that addresses externalities associated with the
deleveraging cycle. It presents a model in which restricting capital inﬂows during
boom times reduces the potential outﬂows during busts. This mitigates the feedback
eﬀects of deleveraging episodes, when tightening ﬁnancial constraints on borrowers and
collapsing prices for collateral assets have mutually reinforcing eﬀects. In our model,
capital controls reduce macroeconomic volatility and increase standard measures of
consumer welfare.
A number of emerging market economies have recently imposed or considered im-
posing controls on capital inﬂows in the face of ﬁerce capital ﬂow bonanzas.1 For
example, Brazil imposed a 2 percent levy on on foreign investments in Brazilian stocks
and ﬁxed-income securities on Oct. 24, 2009 after experiencing a 36 percent appreci-
ation of its currency earlier during the year, and Taiwan followed suit with a similar
measure in November.2 However, while policymakers around the world are clearly
concerned about the eﬀects of volatility in capital ﬂows, the theoretic welfare case for
such intervention has been less clear. The existing literature has studied how capital
ﬂow volatility can trigger feedback cycles that work through the depreciation of the
real exchange rate. See e.g. Javier Bianchi (2010) and Anton Korinek (2009, 2010).
This paper contributes to the debate by presenting a model based on a more general
mechanism that involves asset price deﬂation.
1 Model
We describe a small open economy in a one-good world with three time periods t =
0,1,2. The economy is populated by a continuum of atomistic identical consumers,
with a mass normalized to one. The consumer issues debt in period 0 and repays it in
1See Financial Times, ”Worried nations try to cool hot money,” November 19, 2009.
2Capital controls had also been imposed by Chile over the period of 1991-98, amid mixed reviews. See
e.g. Francisco Gallego et al. (2002) for a discussion.
2periods 1 and 2. In period 1, his ability to roll over debt may be aﬀected by a collateral
constraint. Period 2 represents the long term. Optimism about the future may lead to
a large volume of debt inﬂows in period 0, making the economy vulnerable to a sudden
stop/credit crunch in period 1.
The utility of the representative consumer is given by
u(c0) + u(c1) + c2.
The riskless world interest rate is normalized to zero. Thus the ﬁrst-best level of
consumption is the same in periods 0 and 1 and is given by c∗ satisfying u0(c∗) = 1.
Domestic income involves two components, an endowment e that is obtained in
period 1 and is not pledgeable to foreign creditors, and the return y on an asset that
materializes in period 2 and can be pledged as collateral on loans from foreign investors.
(We assume that the asset is not acquired by foreign investors because residents have a
strong comparative disadvantage in managing it). Each domestic consumer owns one
unit of the asset, and the price of the asset at time t is denoted by pt. For simplicity,
we assume that the asset return y and the endowments are deterministic, except for e,
which is revealed in period 1. Because of a credit constraint, low realizations of e may
trigger countercyclical capital outﬂows or ”sudden stops”.3
Under these assumptions the budget constraints of a domestic consumer are given
by 
      
      
c0 = d1,
c1 + d1 = e + d2,
c2 + d2 = y,
where dt is the debt to be repaid at the beginning of period t. The interest rate is equal
to zero because there is no default in equilibrium. Each consumers faces a collateral
3We could also assume that y is stochastic, leading to a model in which booms and busts in capital
ﬂows are driven by the price of domestic assets (see Olivier Jeanne and Anton Korinek, 2010).
3constraint of the form
d2 ≤ θ1p1, (1)
where θ1 is the quantity of domestic collateral held by the consumer at the beginning
of period 1. Domestic consumers can buy or sell the asset in a perfectly compet-
itive domestic market but in a symmetric equilibrium we must have θ1 = 1. The
micro-foundation for constraint (1) is that a consumer could walk away from his debt,
following which foreign creditors could seize his asset and sell it to other consumers in
the domestic market.4
2 Laissez-faire equilibrium
We solve for the equilibrium going backwards.5 Decentralized agents ﬁrst solve for the
period-1 equilibrium, taking initial liquid net worth m1 = e − d1 as given:
Vlf(m1) = max
d2
{u(c1) + c2} s.t. d2 ≤ p1.
In equilibrium, the period-1 price of the asset is equal to its expected return times the






The ﬁrst-order condition to the period 1 maximization problem is
u
0 (c1) = 1 + λlf,
where λlf is the shadow cost of constraint (1). If the equilibrium is unconstrained, then
c1 = c∗ and p1 = y. The equilibrium is indeed unconstrained if and only if the value
4As we show in Jeanne and Korinek (2010), the constraint can also involve the end-of-period collateral
and be written d2 ≤ φθ2p1 with φ < 1. The only thing that matters is that the collateral constraint
depend on the current price of the asset, p1.
5While the main steps of the derivation are reported below, some details have been omitted and can









Figure 1: Dynamics of Financial Ampliﬁcation





If this condition is violated, the equilibrium is constrained and is characterized by




Both sides of equation (3) are increasing with c1. When the constrained value of
c1 reaches c∗, the equilibrium is unconstrained. In ﬁgure 1 we illustrate the resulting
equilibrium. Since both lines are upward-sloping in the constrained region, small shocks
to liquid net worth can lead to large movements in consumption and asset prices.
The zigzag line in the ﬁgure illustrates how the economy reacts to a small change
in the endowment e by −∆, as indicated by the downward shift in the dashed line:
For the original level of consumption, the borrowing constraint would be violated,
hence consumption has to decline. But this reduces the asset price p1 = y/u0 (c1) and
therefore tightens the borrowing constraint, leading to a downward spiral of declining
consumption and dropping asset prices. This is the the general mechanism behind
standard models of ﬁnancial acceleration or debt deﬂation. In the unconstrained region,
5by contrast, a change in endowment by +∆ (as illustrated by the upper dashed line)
does not aﬀect consumption c1.
We restrict our attention to the case where equation (3) is satisﬁed by at most one




< 1 ∀y,∀c ≤ c
∗. (4)
If this condition is not satisﬁed there might be multiple equilibria, in which a fall in the
price of the domestic asset is self-fulﬁlling because it depresses domestic consumption.6
Equation (3) has a solution c1 if and only if the debt coming to maturity can be repaid
with the available liquid net worth (m1 > 0), and this solution is unique. In reduced
form, we can write the period-1 level of consumption and the price of the asset as
increasing functions of net worth, c(m1) and p(m1).
In the unconstrained regime, capital inﬂows are decreasing in e as a higher en-
dowment shock reduces the need of consumers to borrow abroad. Conversely, if the
economy is credit-constrained (in the ”sudden stop regime”), capital ﬂows become pro-
cyclical, i.e., a lower endowment shock e leads to a lower value of the collateral asset,
reduced borrowing from abroad.
In period 0, decentralized agents solve the maximization problem maxu(c0) +
E0Vlf(m1). Using V 0
lf (m1) = u0 (c1), this yields the ﬁrst-order condition
u
0 (c0) = E0 [u
0 (c1)]. (5)
The left-hand-side and right-hand-side of this equation are respectively decreasing and
increasing in d1. The equation uniquely determines the equilibrium level of d1 under
laissez-faire.
3 Social planner equilibrium
We compare the laissez-faire equilibrium with the allocations chosen by a constrained
social planner who internalizes the asset pricing equation in the economy (2) and
6In the following we abstract from multiplicity for the sake of simplicity.
6realizes that changes in aggregate consumption entail changes in asset prices, which in
turn aﬀect the borrowing constraint. In period 1, the social planner chooses the same
allocation as under laissez-faire. The social planner sets d1 in period 0 to maximize




{u(c1) + c2 + λsp [p(m1) − d2]},
where p(m1) = y/u0(c1), and λsp denotes the shadow price on the credit constraint for
the social planner. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to d2 remains u0 (c1) = 1+λsp.
The diﬀerence with laissez-faire is that the social planner internalizes the endogeneity
of the price to the aggregate level of liquid wealth, m1, which decentralized agents take
as given. By implication the social planner recognizes that the marginal value of liquid
wealth in period 1 is
V
0
sp (m1) = u
0 (c1) + λsp · p
0 (m1).
In the constrained regime, the social marginal value of liquid wealth is larger than its
private marginal value because it includes the impact of aggregate wealth on the price
of collateral.
The planner’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to ﬁrst-period debt d1 is therefore
u
0(c0) = E0 [u
0(c1) + λsp · p
0 (m1)]. (6)
Whenever there are states in which the borrowing constraint is binding in period 1,
both the shadow price λsp and the derivative p0 (m1) are positive, and hence the social
planner makes the economy consume less and issue less debt in period 0 than under
laissez-faire (compare with (5)). This can be interpreted as a macro- (or systemic)
precautionary motive: the social planner internalizes the impact of aggregate debt on
the probability and severity of a sudden stop.
The optimal level of debt could be implemented in a decentralized way by a tax τ
on debt inﬂows that is rebated in lump sum fashion. The ﬁrst-order condition on d1
7under such a tax u0(c0) = (1 + τ)E0(u0(c1)) implies that the optimal tax is given by
τ =




We assume that utility is logarithmic (u(c) = logc) and that e is uniformly distributed
over the interval [¯ e−ε, ¯ e+ε]. The logarithmic utility implies c∗ = 1. As shown in the
technical appendix, under those assumptions the model can be solved almost entirely
in closed form. We assume m∗ = 0.2 and ¯ e = 1.3.
Figure 2 shows how the probability of a sudden stop (under laissez-faire and with
the social planner) and the optimal tax τ vary with the maximum size of the endowment
shock ε. For ε < ¯ e−m∗−1 = 0.1, the economy is never constrained under laissez-faire
so that the optimal tax is equal to zero. If ε > 0.1, the probability of a sudden stop is
positive and increasing in the downside risk—it reaches almost 20 percent for ε = 0.3
under laissez-faire. Meanwhile the expected consumption gap (c∗ − c1)/c∗ conditional
on a sudden stop increases from zero to about 28 percent (not shown on the ﬁgure).
The ﬁgure illustrates the extent to which the social planner insures the economy
against the risk of a sudden stop. For ε ' 0.13, the probability of sudden stop is
reduced from 10 percent under laissez-faire to 6.8 percent by the social planner with
a rather moderate tax of τ ' 1.3 percent.7 The optimal tax increases more than
proportionately with the probability of a sudden stop because large sudden stops are
costly in terms of domestic welfare. If ε = 0.3, the social planner imposes a hefty tax
of 11.4 percent on debt inﬂows so as to reduce the probability of a sudden stop from
19 to 12 percent.
7The social planner reduces not only the probability but also the average size of the sudden stops. The
expected consumption gap conditional on a sudden stop is lowered from 6.8 percent to 4.6 percent by
the tax.












Figure 2: Probability of Sudden Stop and Optimal Tax
5 Discussion
Contingent Liabilities If other forms of liability are available, the ampliﬁcation dy-
namics in the economy are mitigated, and so are the resulting externalities. However,
in practice risk markets are often incomplete due to problems such as asymmetric in-
formation, and international debt ﬂows are pervasive. Even if decentralized agents
have access to ex ante complete insurance markets, there may be reasons why they
choose to expose themselves to binding constraints and trigger ineﬃcient ﬁnancial ac-
celerator dynamics in some states of nature. This is the case for instance if lenders are
risk-averse, as discussed in more detail in Korinek (2009, 2010).
Investment If we introduce risky investment decisions into the model, we ﬁnd
similar distortions. Decentralized agents undervalue the social costs of losses in low
output states, and therefore expose themselves excessively to risky projects that fail
when aggregate output is low. By the same token, they undervalue insurance and
invest insuﬃciently in counter-cyclical projects that would yield positive payoﬀs in
states with low aggregate endowment shocks.
Bailouts Our analysis above assumed that the only intervention available to a social
planner was the imposition of ex-ante taxes on borrowing. In the real world, another
common policy instrument is bailouts that aim to loosen binding constraints by directly
9transferring resources to constrained agents. In our setup above, a one dollar transfer
to constrained agents would relax constraints and trigger positive ampliﬁcation eﬀects





However, there are two important limitations to bailouts: First, a self-ﬁnancing
bailout, i.e. a bailout that does not involve a permanent resource transfer from outside
the economy, is only possible if the planner has either accumulated resources ex ante
or has a superior capacity ex post to collect repayments after the bailout.8 Secondly, to
the extent that bailouts are anticipated, they create signiﬁcant moral hazard concerns,
i.e., they induce decentralized agents to increase their borrowing ex ante, making it
more likely that constraints will be binding and crises will occur.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model of collateralized international borrowing, in which
the value of collateral assets endogenously depends on the state of the economy. When
ﬁnancial constraints are binding in such a setup, ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects (sudden
stops) arise as declining collateral values, tightening ﬁnancial constraints and falling
consumption mutually reinforce each other.
Such ampliﬁcation eﬀects are not internalized by individual borrowers and consti-
tute a negative externality that provides a natural rationale for the Pigouvian taxation
of international borrowing. In a sample calibration we found the optimal Pigouvian tax
on foreign debt to be 1.3 percent per dollar borrowed for an economy that experiences
sudden stops with 10 percent probability. A fuller characterization of the externalities
stemming from ﬁnancial ampliﬁcation eﬀects in an inﬁnite-horizon DSGE framework
as well as the resulting optimal Pigouvian taxes are presented in Jeanne and Korinek
(2010).
8In other words, the bailout loan will only be repaid if lending by the planner is not subject to constraint
(1).
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11Technical Appendix
A1. Derivation of ﬁrst-order conditions




c0 = d1 + (1 − θ1)p0,
c1 + d1 = e + d2 + (θ1 − θ2)p1,
c2 + d2 = θ2y,
where θt is the quantity of the domestic collateral asset held by the consumer at the
beginning of period t and dt is the debt to be repaid at the beginning of period t. The
budget constraints in the text assume θt = 1, which is true in equilibrium.9 However
to derive the asset pricing equation (2) we need to take into account the fact that θt
could be diﬀerent from 1 at the individual level.
Utility is maximized under the collateral constraint (1). In period 1, thus, the
representative consumer solves the problem,
max
d2,θ2
u(e + d2 + (θ1 − θ2)p1 − d1) + θ2y − d2 + λlf(θ1p1 − d2),
where λlf is the shadow cost of the constraint. The ﬁrst-order condition for θ2 is
u0(c1)p1 = y, which gives equation (2). The ﬁrst-order condition for d2 is u0(c1) =
1 + λlf.
A2. Numerical illustration: the log-utility-uniform-distribution case
If u(c) = logc, then c∗ = 1. Condition (4), which ensures equilibrium uniqueness,
is satisﬁed iﬀ y < 1.
We assume e is uniformly distributed in [¯ e − ε, ¯ e + ε]. Equation (3) has a solution
c1 ≥ 0 if and only if m1 = e − d1 ≥ 0. Since this inequality must be satisﬁed for any
realization of e we must have d1 < mine = e − ε. This is true provided that
ε < ¯ e − d1.
The equilibrium level of consumption is the min of c∗ = 1 and the constrained level of








where m∗ ≡ 1 − y > 0.
9In our model consumers are in fact indiﬀerent between holding the collateral asset or bonds between
periods 1 and 2 so long as they are unconstrained in period 1. As a result, their portfolio composi-
tion may be indeterminate. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we limit our focus on the
symmetric equilibrium where the asset and bond holdings of all agents are identical.
12Equation (2) implies that the price of collateral is given by







The calibration will be characterized in terms of three parameters: m∗, ¯ e and ε.
First, let us derive a condition that is necessary and suﬃcient for the economy to be
constrained with some probability. If the economy is never constrained then c1 = 1
and condition (5) implies c0 = 1 so that d1 = c0 = 1. The economy is then indeed
unconstrained in period 1 iﬀ d2 = c∗ + d1 − e = 2 − e is smaller than y for all possible
realizations of e, that is if
¯ e > 1 + m
∗ + ε.
Conversely, if ¯ e < 1 + m∗ + ε there is a nonzero probability that the credit constraint
binds in period 1. The constraint is binding in period 1 if and only if m1 < m∗, that is
e < m
∗ + d1.
We will consider calibrations such that the economy would not be constrained in the
absence of uncertainty but may be constrained for suﬃciently large negative shocks,
that is
1 + m
∗ < ¯ e < 1 + m
∗ + ε.
Let us assume ε > e−m∗ −1, so that the economy is constrained in period 1 with



























¯ e − ε − d1





This equation determines the level of debt under laissez-faire, d
lf
1 . One can show
that this equation determines a unique level of d1 through the following steps. First,
note that E0[u0(c1)] > 1 (since c1 < 1 in the constrained state and c1 = 1 in the
unconstrained state). This implies that the rhs is above the lhs for d1 ≥ 1, and that
d
lf
1 must be strictly lower than 1. Second, note that d
lf
1 > ¯ e − m∗ − ε: otherwise
the economy is never credit constrained and the ﬁrst-order condition above cannot be
satisﬁed (the lhs is above the rhs, so that the consumer would increase its debt until the
constraint becomes binding with some probability). Third, one can show that the rhs












13Thus it follows that the rhs and lhs are equal for one unique d
lf
1 , which satisﬁes
¯ e − m
∗ − ε < d
lf
1 < 1.
The ﬁxed-point equation for d1 can be solved numerically to ﬁnd the laissez-faire
equilibrium level d
lf
1 given the exogenous parameters m∗, ¯ e and ε.















1/m∗ − 1 if m1 < m∗,
0 if m1 ≥ m∗.































¯ e − ε − d1

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which again determines one unique level of d1, which we denote by d
sp




¯ e − m





The optimal tax rate on debt inﬂows satisﬁes









Then using the ﬁxed-point equation for d
sp































1 + τ =
1




One would like to calibrate the model so as to obtain ”reasonable values” for the
probability and size of a sudden stop. We now explain how to derive the underlying
14parameters m∗, ¯ e and ε from assumptions about the levels of the probability of a sudden
stop and of the expected consumption gap c∗ − c1 conditional on a sudden stop. The











¯ e − m∗ − d1
2ε
.
Note that since d1 < 1, we have d1 + m∗ < ¯ e so that the probability of a sudden stop
must be lower that 1/2.




¯ e − ε − d1
m∗
= 1 − 2
επ
m∗,
which implies, if we denote by ∆c the expected consumption gap c∗ − c1 conditional











and a relationship between e, d1 and ε,
¯ e − d1
ε









































Given a value for ¯ e, the values of ε and m∗ can be derived using
ε =
¯ e − d
lf
1







15The condition 1 + m∗ < ¯ e is satisﬁed iﬀ








One can choose ¯ e arbitrarily subject to this condition.
Section 4 of the paper presents the following numerical illustration: e = 1.3 and
y = 0.8 (or m∗ = 0.2). Thus the constraint is binding with nonzero probability if
ε > e − m∗ − 1 = 0.1. Figure 2 was constructed as follows. For ε between 0 and 0.3
(we use an evenly spaced grid with 50 points) we compute:




1 by solving for the ﬁxed-point equations (7) and (8);
• the probability of sudden stop under laissez-faire and the social planner, πlf and
πsp, using equation (10);
• the expected consumption gaps under laissez-faire and the social planner using
equation (11);
• the optimal tax on capital inﬂows τ using equation (9).
Figure 2 shows the variation with ε of πlf, πsp and τ.
16